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ARTICLES
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE PROBLEM
Abner S. Greene*
INTRODUCrION
T is probably unconstitutional for teachers to lead the pledge of
allegiance to the United States flag in public school classrooms,
even if students have the option not to participate. This somewhat
startling claim does not follow from any grand theory of liberalism,
has nothing to do with the words "one nation under God," and does
not stem from an elaborate or controversial reading of Supreme Court
precedent. Rather, the assertion that the pledge of allegiance may not
be led by teachers in public schools follows neatly from the Court's
own writings. Yet, no court has ever held that teachers may not lead
the pledge of allegiance in public schools, and the only court to ad-
dress the issue held otherwise. This Article sets forth the argument
that the pledge of allegiance is unconstitutional when led by teachers
in public schools,1 even with an opt-out provision, and then suggests
some ways to revise constitutional doctrine to avoid this result.
Here are the basic steps to the conclusion that teachers may not
lead the pledge of allegiance in public schools: In Lee v. Weisman,2
the Court invalidated government-sponsored prayer at a public secon-
dary school graduation ceremony. The majority opinion, authored by
Justice Kennedy, turned on a finding of psychological coercion.
Although no student was legally compelled to participate in the
prayer, Justice Kennedy wrote that the psychological pressure on 14-
year-olds was the constitutional equivalent of legal coercion.3 In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that
public schools may not compel students to participate in the pledge of
allegiance. Barnette was the first in a series of cases addressing the
right not to speak, which prohibits the government from compelling
expression in which the speaker does not wish to engage. Barnette
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. Yale Univer-
sity, 1982; J.D. University of Michigan, 1986. I am grateful for helpful comments from
Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Tracy Higgins, Bill Treanor, and Ben Zipursky. For
comments on a prior draft, I thank participants in a workshop at the University of
Chicago Law School
1. I refer throughout to teacher-led prayer to distinguish student prayer not in-
volving governmental personnel, which is presumptively protected under the Free
Speech Clause. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding that denying religious groups access to school premises
violated the Free Speech Clause).
2. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
3. Id. at 593-94.
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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involved legal coercion; West Virginia schools had the authority to ex-
pel students for failing to participate in the pledge of allegiance. But
Weisman holds that when the government sponsors prayer in public
schools, psychological pressure counts as coercion. There's no reason
to believe the psychological pressure to recite the pledge of allegiance
is any weaker than the psychological pressure to join in prayer. Thus,
combining Weisman and Barnette, we reach the conclusion that the
psychological pressure on students to join in a governmentally spon-
sored pledge of allegiance violates the right not to speak of students
who would prefer not to recite the pledge.
Dissenting in Weisman, Justice Scalia made this precise point. He
wrote:
[T]he Court itself has not given careful consideration to its test of
psychological coercion. For if it had, how could it observe, with no
hint of concern or disapproval, that students stood for the Pledge of
Allegiance, which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's invo-
cation? The government can, of course, no more coerce political
orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy (citing Barnette).... If students
were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invoca-
tion, they must also have been psychologically coerced, moments
before, to stand for (and thereby, in the Court's view, take part in or
appear to take part in) the Pledge. Must the Pledge therefore be
barred from the public schools ... ? In Barnette we held that a
public-school student could not be compelled to recite the Pledge;
we did not even hint that she could not be compelled to observe
respectful silence-indeed, even to stand in respectful silence-
when those who wished to recite it did so.5
The Court had no response to this point, and has not since addressed
it. Only one lower court has addressed the issue. In Sherman v. Com-
munity Consolidated School District,6 Judge Easterbrook wrote for a
Seventh Circuit panel that even after Weisman, teachers may constitu-
tionally lead the pledge of allegiance in public schools. Judge Easter-
brook agreed that the "analogy" to Weisman in the pledge of
allegiance setting is "sound," but explained that "[a]s an understand-
ing of the first amendment it is defective."' 7 He continued:
5. 505 U.S. at 638-39 (citations omitted). I have deleted the following sentence(which appears after the citation to Barnette): "Moreover, since the Pledge of Alle-
giance has been revised since Barnette to include the phrase 'under God,' recital of
the Pledge would appear to raise the same Establishment Clause issue as the invoca-
tion and benediction." Id. at 639. I do not take Justice Scalia to be arguing merely
that the words "under God" in the Pledge render a teacher-led Pledge in the public
schools a violation of the Establishment Clause. I understand the paragraph quoted
in the text to make the additional point that adding together Justice Kennedy's psy-
chological coercion analysis and the holding in Barnette, public school teachers would
be disabled from leading the Pledge in class. That is why Justice Scalia states that
government may "no more coerce political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy." Id.
6. 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993).
7. Id. at 444.
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The religion clauses of the first amendment do not establish general
rules about speech or schools; they call for religion to be treated
differently.... Patriotism is an effort by the state to promote its own
survival, and along the way to teach those virtues that justify its sur-
vival. Public schools help to transmit those virtues and values. Sep-
aration of church from state does not imply separation of state from
state. Schools are entitled to hold their causes and values out as
worthy subjects of approval and adoption, to persuade even though
they cannot compel, and even though those who resist persuasion
may feel at odds with those who embrace the values they are
taught.8
He then added that "[a]n extension of the school-prayer cases could
not stop with the Pledge of Allegiance. It would extend to the books,
essays, tests, and discussions in every classroom." 9 Thus, concluded
Judge Easterbrook, "All that remains is Barnette itself, and so long as
the school does not compel pupils to espouse the content of the
Pledge as their own belief, it may carry on with patriotic exercises." 10
Judge Easterbrook's reasoning is flawed. His argument divides into
two parts. He first claims that the Establishment Clause makes the
prayer case different from the pledge of allegiance case. It is true that
the Establishment Clause bars governmental involvement in promot-
ing religion and that neither the Establishment Clause nor any other
part of the Constitution bars governmental involvement in promoting
patriotism (putting aside for the moment the question of means). For
example, government may officially endorse nonreligious ends, such
as patriotism, by flying the flag, or the hazards of smoking, by posting
warning signs, but may not officially endorse a particular religion
through placing that religion's symbols on government property."
Furthermore, government may enact legislation with a predominantly
secular justification, but may not enact legislation with a predomi-
nantly religious justification. 12 Additionally, government may fund
the teaching of secular doctrine, but may not fund the teaching of reli-
gious doctrine.13 As I discuss below in part lI.A, had the Weisman
Court relied solely or even primarily on the structural argument that
the Establishment Clause bars governmental promotion of religion,
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 980 F.2d at 445.
11. See e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612-13 (1989) (holding
that display of a cr6che on government property endorsed a patently religious
message and thus violated the Establishment Clause).
12. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (holding that a law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution solely justified on religious grounds violates the
First Amendment); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (holding that a
statute forbidding the teaching of evolution unaccompanied by instruction in creation
science violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks a clear secular purpose).
13. See e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,619 (1971) (discussing the concern




then Judge Easterbrook would be correct in asserting that teacher-led
prayer in public schools is unconstitutional whereas a teacher-led
pledge of allegiance in public schools is not. But the majority opinion
in Weisman does not rely primarily on the structural Establishment
Clause argument. It rests instead on equating psychological coercion
with legal coercion in the public school setting.14 Judge Easterbrook
does not argue that psychological coercion disappears when we move
from prayer to pledge, and he offers no argument for the proposition
that we should treat psychological coercion as relevant to Establish-
ment Clause analysis but irrelevant to right not to speak analysis. In
fact, he neither confronts nor cites the passage of Justice Scalia's Weis-
man dissent quoted above. Thus, although the Establishment Clause
often renders governmental involvement in religion unconstitutional
while allowing parallel governmental involvement in secular activities,
coercion is a concern of both the Establishment Clause (if we adopt
Justice Kennedy's Weisman argument) and the Free Speech Clause
(under Barnette). In part III.B.7, I ultimately agree with Judge Easter-
brook that we should treat psychological coercion as sufficient to
invalidate teacher-led public school prayer but as insufficient to invali-
date a teacher-led public school pledge of allegiance. But I reach that
conclusion only by reconsidering the Court's right not to speak doc-
trine. Under the doctrine as articulated by the Court, there is little
reason to believe that psychological coercion should be treated any
differently for the pledge than for prayer.
Judge Easterbrook's second claim is that extending Weisman to the
pledge of allegiance setting would open the floodgates and imperil all
of public education. 15 Students must often engage educational materi-
als that offend their values; if the peer pressure to say the pledge of
allegiance is sufficient to scuttle the saying of the pledge, then the peer
pressure to engage in many other classroom activities should be suffi-
cient to render them unconstitutional, as well.1 6 This argument, how-
ever, overlooks the right not to speak basis of the constitutional claim.
The right not to speak does not prevent government from exposing
students to materials they find offensive, nor from requiring student
participation in classroom exercises, tests, etc., involving those materi-
als. Rather, the right not to speak prevents government from compel-
ling students-and here we're assuming this means legally or
psychologically-to utter words they prefer not to utter. Extending
Weisman to the pledge of allegiance setting would, admittedly, require
the invalidation of certain types of classroom recitation, but it would
leave alone most educational methods, since they do not involve com-
pelled utterances.
14. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992).
15. Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 444 (7th Cir. 1992),




In sum, Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Sherman does not success-
fully deal with Justice Scalia's suggestion that the combination of
Weisman and Barnette renders a teacher-led pledge of allegiance in
public school unconstitutional. We are left with the analogy that if
psychological coercion counts as coercion, and if peer pressure in pub-
lic schools counts as psychological coercion, then all governmentally
led group utterances in public schools are unconstitutional, whether or
not those utterances are religious in nature. The remainder of this
Article describes how this situation came about and offers some ways
out of it. Part I reviews the school prayer cases, revealing that Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Weisman marked a significant turn from the
structural view of the Establishment Clause to a coercion-based view.
Part II explores the right not to speak cases, showing a complex set of
concerns grouped under one heading. Part I relies on observations
from parts I and H to offer two escape hatches from the conclusion
that teachers may not constitutionally lead the pledge of allegiance in
public schools. The first escape hatch involves returning to the struc-
tural view of the Establishment Clause, eliminating psychological co-
ercion as a factor. If psychological coercion no longer counts for
constitutional analysis, then governmentally led prayer in public
schools would still be unconstitutional (the Establishment Clause for-
bids it as a structural matter), but a governmentally led pledge of alle-
giance in public schools would be constitutional, absent direct legal
coercion (because there is no constitutional provision that bars the
government from advancing its view of the good, in public schools or
elsewhere).' 7 The second escape hatch requires unpacking the right
not to speak, reshaping it not as a free speech right but as an auton-
omy right, which we might think of as violated by direct legal coercion
but not by psychological coercion.
I. THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES
The Court could have taken a clean, schematic approach from the
beginning. It could have held that coercion is relevant to Free Exer-
cise Clause claims (the government may not attempt to coerce reli-
gious belief, worship, prayer, etc.) and to cognate Free Speech Clause
claims (the government may not attempt to coerce any belief, thought,
expression, etc.). The Establishment Clause, on this view, would
cover noncoercive governmental participation in religious activities.
Although not all such involvement would be invalidated (lines would
have to be drawn), governmentally prescribed and led prayer in the
public schools would constitute a clear infringement of the structural
17. This argument brackets the question whether selective funding of public
schools but not of private schools violates the rights of parents to educate their chil-
dren as the parents see fit. The more extreme claim-that government may not con-
stitutionally seek to advance its view of the good in public schools (even if
evenhanded funding of private schools were offered)-seems to me groundless.
1995]
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separation of powers between civil government and religious institu-
tions. In this way, governmentally sponsored prayer in the public
schools would be invalidated under the Establishment Clause, regard-
less of whether such prayer was coercive. Governmentally sponsored
nonreligious utterances-such as the pledge of allegiance-would be
presumptively valid. But although presumptively valid, such nonreli-
gious utterances would still be subject to a noncoercion rule under the
Free Speech Clause. Whether psychological pressure on children to
engage in utterances counts as coercion would be a separate question.
If the Court concluded that psychological pressure does not count as
coercion for constitutional analysis, it would still invalidate teacher-
led prayer in public school on the structural argument.
In the early school prayer cases, the Court took the structural ap-
proach, expressly stating that coercion is not necessary to prove an
Establishment Clause violation. In the later school prayer case, Lee v.
Weisman, 8 the Court brought coercion into the Establishment Clause
test. In this part, I discuss the Court's school prayer opinions. Part
III.A suggests that returning to a structural view of the Establishment
Clause, combined with a narrower view of coercion, would enable
teachers in public schools to lead the pledge of allegiance and other
nonreligious group recitations, so long as students were not compelled
to participate through threat of legal sanction.
A. The Structural Approach: Engel and Schempp
When the Supreme Court first held teacher-led prayer in public
schools unconstitutional, it stressed a set of structural Establishment
Clause arguments, and expressly refused to make coercion the touch-
stone of the analysis. Three possible questions regarding coercion are
relevant here: (a) Is proof of coercion sufficient for an Establishment
Clause claim? (b) If so, is proof of coercion necessary for an Estab-
lishment Clause claim? (c) Is psychological pressure to participate in
government-sponsored prayer the constitutional equivalent of legal
coercion? In both Engel v. Vitale 9 and Abington Township School
District v. Schempp, ° the Court avoided questions (a) and (c) by an-
swering question (b) with a clear "No"-proof of coercion is not nec-
essary for an Establishment Clause claim.
The Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause deprives govern-
ment of the power to prescribe and lead prayer, at least in the public
schools. The basic point is a structural one: prescribing and leading
prayer is for private citizens and religious institutions, and is not part
of the job of persons acting in their public, governmental capacity.
Engel declares that the Establishment Clause
18. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
19. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
20. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the Ameri-
can people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government....
... [E]ach separate government in this country should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance. 1
In an important passage in Engel, the Court explained its reasons for
relying on this structural view, and rejected the argument that coer-
cion is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause cause of
action:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially
prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve co-
ercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform
to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the pur-
poses underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than
that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that
a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion?2
In Schempp, the Court again stressed that "a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment
Clause violation need not be so attended."'  Thus, by relying on the
structural argument, the Court in both of the early school prayer cases
rejected coercion as a necessary element of an Establishment Clause
violation, at least in the school prayer setting.
Moreover, because the structural argument is itself sufficient to
make out an Establishment Clause claim-"a union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion" 24-
the Court did not have to (and did not) resolve questions (a) and (c),
namely, whether proof of coercion is sufficient for an Establishment
Clause claim and whether psychological pressure counts as coercion
for constitutional analysis. To be sure, Engel recognizes that govern-
mental support for the majority religion places "indirect coercive pres-
sure" on minority religions. But recognizing psychological pressure as
coercive is not the same thing as considering that type of coercion
21. 370 U.S. at 425, 435.
22. Id. at 430-31.
23. 374 U.S. at 223.
24. 370 U.S. at 431.
1995]
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sufficient to make out a constitutional claim. Engel does the former,
but does not address the latter.
Thus, after Engel and Schempp, teacher-led prayer in public schools
was unconstitutional, not because of coercion (psychological or other-
wise), but because of the structural claim that government may not
prescribe and lead prayer. The Court did not have to determine
whether psychological pressure constituted coercion for constitutional
analysis. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, clearly stated that
the psychological pressure on students who wanted to opt out of pray-
ing violates the Free Exercise Clause,25 but the other Justices in the
majority did not address this contention. I return to Justice Brennan's
argument in part III.A, when I discuss the possibility of disconnecting
psychological pressure from constitutionally relevant coercion.
B. Coercion Becomes Relevant. Lee v. Weisman
Lee v. Weisman26 could have been a simple extension of the early
school prayer cases. The Court could have said that a governmentally
sponsored prayer at a public secondary school graduation ceremony
violates the Establishment Clause because government may not in-
volve itself in prayer services. Instead, Justice Kennedy wrote a ma-
jority opinion that brings coercion into the Establishment Clause
analysis and that relies heavily on deeming psychological pressure co-
ercive for constitutional analysis.
Justice Kennedy's opinion is somewhat difficult to parse. At times,
it stresses the structural concerns from Engel and Schempp. For
example:
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious be-
liefs and religious expression are too precious to be either pro-
scribed or prescribed by the State. The design of the Constitution is
that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship
is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere,
which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission....
... The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience
and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the
First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohi-
bition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no pre-
cise counterpart in the speech provisions. 27
At other points, however, Justice Kennedy stresses the coercive aspect
of the psychological pressure faced by the graduating 14-year-olds.
For example, consider the opening of Justice Kennedy's legal analysis:
25. 374 U.S. at 288-90.
26. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
27. Id. at 589-91.
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These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our deci-
sion: State officials direct the performance of a formal religious ex-
ercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary
schools. Even for those students who object to the religious exer-
cise, their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored reli-
gious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the
school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt
of the diploma.28
And consider the end of the opinion:
The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be
conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we
have found, young graduates who object are induced to conform.
No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or
compel a student to participate in a religious exercise. That is being
done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment? 9
I will set forth in a moment the passages in which Justice Kennedy
holds that psychological pressure constitutes coercion for constitu-
tional analysis. The above-quoted passages reveal that coercion is a
sufficient factor in determining whether the Establishment Clause has
been violated, which is a step beyond Engel and Schempp. Justice
Kennedy never quite makes clear whether coercion (legal or psycho-
logical) is a necessary factor in the analysis, but considering his prior
views on the subject, it seems that for him (and for him alone among
the five Justices in the majority),30 a plaintiff must show coercion to
prove an Establishment Clause violation, at least in the school-prayer
setting. Three years before Weisman, Justice Kennedy authored a sep-
arate opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACL U,31 a case involving
religious symbols on government property. Justice Kennedy (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia) wrote that
the Establishment Clause may be violated in only two ways:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in
such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so." 32
In Weisman, Justice Kennedy never suggests that governmentally
sponsored graduation prayer "establishes a state religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so." He does suggest, often, that such prayer in
the public school setting constitutes coercion. Thus, it appears that, at
28. Id. at 586.
29. Id. at 599.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
31. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
32. Id. at 659 (citation omitted).
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least for Justice Kennedy, absent an established state religion, coer-
cion is a necessary predicate for an Establishment Clause claim.
I say that Justice Kennedy is alone among the five-Justice majority
in deeming coercion a necessary predicate for an Establishment
Clause claim (absent an established state religion), because the Jus-
tices joining Justice Kennedy's majority opinion-Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter-wrote and joined separate opinions
to stress that for them, coercion was not necessary to an Establish-
ment Clause claim. Thus, Justice Blackmun wrote, in an opinion
joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, "our precedents make clear
that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. '33 Justice Blackmun did, however, add that
coercion is "sufficient" to prove an Establishment Clause violation,
and he equated "[g]overnment pressure to participate in a religious
activity" with coercion.34 Justice Souter did not join Justice Black-
mun's concurrence, but agreed in his own concurrence (also joined by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor) that coercion is not a necessary ele-
ment of an Establishment Clause violation.35 Justice Souter did not
offer an opinion on whether coercion is sufficient to prove an Estab-
lishment Clause violation.
Assuming, therefore, that there is no majority for the combined
proposition that (d) psychological pressure constitutes coercion for
constitutional analysis and (e) absent an established state religion,
proof of coercion is necessary to make out an Establishment Clause
violation-Justice Kennedy appears to be the only Justice in Weisman
to think both parts of this proposition true-there is, still, a clear five-
Justice majority for the combined proposition that (d) psychological
pressure constitutes coercion for constitutional analysis and (f) proof
of coercion is sufficient for an Establishment Clause claim.3 6 So long
as this proposition holds, it is but a short step to the conclusion that
teachers may not lead the pledge of allegiance in public schools, be-
cause the same psychological pressure is present to participate in the
pledge as it is to participate in prayer, and because the right not to
speak is violated by coerced speech just as the Establishment Clause is
violated by coerced prayer. As I suggest in part III.A, one way
around this conclusion, while still maintaining a ban on governmen-
tally sponsored prayer in public schools, is to jettison the equation of
psychological pressure with coercion for constitutional analysis, while
returning to the purely structural view of the Establishment Clause.
33. 505 U.S. at 604.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 619.
36. Even though Justice Souter did not, in his concurrence, state clearly that coer-




The Weisman Court equated psychological pressure with coercion
in a somewhat unusual way. First, the Court refused to accept the
parties' stipulation that attendance at the graduation ceremony is vol-
untary. "[T]o say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her
high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme."' 3 This seems
sensible. Second, Justice Kennedy wrote:
[T]he school district's supervision and control of a high school grad-
uation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respect-
ful silence during the Invocation and Benediction. This pressure,
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.
Of course, in our culture standing or remaining silent can signify
adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of others. And
no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a prayer have
little objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do.
But for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable per-
ception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her
conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real. There can be no
doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation,
the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of partici-
pation in the Rabbi's prayer. That was the very point of the reli-
gious exercise. It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told
that for her the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere
respect, rather than participation. What matters is that, given our
social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could be-
lieve that the group exercise signified her own participation or ap-
proval of it.
Finding no violation under these circumstances would place ob-
jectors in the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or pro-
testing. We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the
affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State may not,
consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secon-
dary school children in this position....
The injury caused by the government's action, and the reason
why [plaintiffs] object to it, is that the State, in a school setting, in
effect required participation in a religious exercise.38
Although Justice Kennedy ends this discussion by asserting that the
State "in effect required participation in a religious exercise, '39 most
of the discussion focuses not on the compulsion to participate in
prayer, but on compulsion to engage in activity that a reasonable ob-
server would construe as participation in prayer. The obvious way out
of this dilemma, for the dissenting student, is to display a protest to
the prayer, but Justice Kennedy clearly states that the government
37. 505 U.S. at 595.
38. Id. at 593-94.
39. Id. at 594.
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may not constitutionally "place primary and secondary school chil-
dren in this position. ''40
Now it is one thing to hold that psychological pressure to pray is
unconstitutional. It is a further step (though probably a correct one)
to hold unconstitutional psychological pressure to engage in activity
that a reasonable observer would construe as praying. Underneath
this second step, however, is the empirical prediction that a reason-
able observer would construe the absence of protest as participation
in prayer. Justice Scalia criticized the Court sharply on precisely this
point, arguing that a reasonable observer would have no reason to
conclude that a student sitting or standing in silence is participating in
prayer.41 I agree with Justice Scalia that it is wrong to posit that a
reasonable observer necessarily would think a nonprotesting student
is thereby participating in prayer. Even if one agreed with this cri-
tique of Justice Kennedy's opinion, of course, there would still be the
questions whether students in cases such as Weisman are psychologi-
cally pressured to pray (an empirical question that Justice Kennedy
does not address) in a way that constitutes coercion for constitutional
analysis (a legal question). A related question is whether courts
should evaluate this matter case by case, requiring proof that particu-
lar plaintiffs were in fact psychologically pressured to pray, or whether
courts should instead reach a conclusion on this question wholesale, as
it were, either ruling that peer pressure is sufficiently great that we
should assume that constitutionally relevant coercion is present, or
holding that legal coercion only (e.g., expulsion for failing to pray)
counts for constitutional analysis.
In any event, Weisman holds that when government sponsors a
group prayer at a public secondary school graduation ceremony, psy-
chological pressure on students is sufficiently great to constitute coer-
cion for constitutional analysis and to render the prayer invalid. If we
accept this analysis, then we should apply it to governmentally spon-
sored nonreligious utterances in the public school setting, for the psy-
chological pressure to participate, or at least not to protest (and
thereby, according to Justice Kennedy, to signal participation), is just
as great. (If not greater. There is an argument that it is easier to show
40. Id. at 593. If we accept for the moment (but see discussion in the text immedi-
ately below) the argument that absent a protest, others will perceive a student as
participating in prayer, then Justice Kennedy's argument here makes sense, for the
government would be forcing children to choose between remaining silent (and thus
evidencing participation in prayer) and outwardly protesting. This deprives the chil-
dren of a third option: remaining silent with no attendant ramifications.
41. Id. at 637. As I discuss in part III.B, the right not to speak cases should re-
quire case-by-case evaluation of whether reasonable observers would associate com-
pelled utterances with the speaker or with the government. As I will argue, if a
reasonable observer would know that the utterance is compelled, and is not freely
chosen by the speaker, then the Free Speech Clause is probably the wrong hook on
which to hang a constitutional claim. The compulsion is still problematic, but the
violation is of autonomy or personhood.
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dissent from organized prayer than from an organized pledge of alle-
giance, for most people know and respect religious pluralism, but few
people tolerate dissenters from flag worship.)
II. THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK CASES
There are two categories of cases here, first, cases in which the gov-
ernment compels speakers to utter or foster the government's own
message, and second, cases in which the government compels speakers
to foster a private party's message.
A. Compelling the Government's Message
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,42 the Court held that gov-
ernment may constitutionally require students in public schools to
participate in a teacher-led pledge of allegiance to the United States
flag. Three years later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,43 the Court overruled Gobitis, holding that the Constitution
forbids such compelled expression. The Court did not invalidate the
pledge in public schools; rather, it held that States may not require
students to participate." Furthermore, although plaintiffs were mem-
bers of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith raising religious objections to
saying the pledge, the Court did not limit its holding to those with
religious objections. The Court was not entirely clear about which
constitutional provision was at stake. Although the Court referred
generally to a "right of self-determination,"45 most of the majority
opinion refers more specifically to the First Amendment: After men-
tioning "the free speech guaranties of the Constitution,"' the opinion
states that "[o]bjection to this form of communication when coerced is
an old one;"'47 it asks "[w]hether the First Amendment of the Consti-
tution will permit officials to order observance of ritual of this na-
ture;"' it distinguishes the "vagueness of the due process clause,"4 9
observing that "freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed" if the government has only a "rational
basis" for so doing;50 finally, it holds that "the action of the local au-
thorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitu-
tional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Con-
stitution to reserve from all official control."51 These passages do not
42. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
43. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. Id. at 641-42.
45. Id. at 631.
46. Id at 633.
47. Id
48. 319 U.S. at 634.
49. Id at 639.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 642.
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indicate clearly whether the Court viewed the right against govern-
mentally compelled expression to be a product of the various clauses
of the First Amendment, or, instead, to be more specifically a Free
Speech Clause right.
Since Barnette, the Court has decided seven cases involving govern-
mentally compelled expression. Some of these right not to speak
cases have rested squarely on the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, while others, like Barnette, have referred more generally
to the First Amendment, without specifying the Free Speech Clause.
None of the right not to speak cases after Barnette has involved com-
pelled oral speech, and only one has involved the government seeking
to advance its own message, as opposed to helping private citizens
advance their messages. That case was Wooley v. Maynard,2 in which
New Hampshire had required all passenger license plates to bear the
State's motto, "Live Free or Die." Again in response to a suit by a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, the Court held that the
State may not constitutionally require citizens to carry an objectiona-
ble message on their vehicle license plates. The Court stated:
[Tlhe right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the
right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must
also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such con-
cepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of "individual
freedom of mind."53
The Court later referred to plaintiffs' "interests as implicating First
Amendment protections,"54 and to "an individual's First Amendment
right to avoid becoming the courier for [the State's] message. '55 Thus,
as in Barnette, the Court relied on the First Amendment without spec-
ifying the Free Speech Clause.
B. Compelling a Private Party's Message
The Court has decided six cases involving state action compelling
one party to carry or foster the speech of another.56 In the two cases
in which the compulsion was upheld as constitutional, the Court relied
on specific facts about the forums involved. The first such case was
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,57 upholding FCC actions requir-
ing broadcasters to give free reply time to a party claiming to have
52. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
53. Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 715.
55. Id. at 717.
56. Six is the correct number if we count Red Lion and its progeny as one case,
and if we count Abood and its progeny as one case. See infra notes 59 and 80.
57. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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been personally attacked by another over a radio or television station.
Rejecting a free speech and free press challenge, the Court held that
because broadcasting involves spectrum scarcity, not every person can
respond easily to an attack over the airwaves. "Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable F'rst
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write, or publish.""8 Because the government must
allocate the scarce broadcasting spectrums, it may insist on a type of
sharing, which involves a right to reply to personal attacks. In other
words, broadcasting as a forum is neither typically public (streets and
parks), in which the government may not require one citizen to carry
the message of another, nor is it typically private (one's home), in
which, again, the government may not require one citizen to carry the
message of another. Broadcasting spectrums, at least in the world ad-
dressed by the Red Lion Court,5 9 are somewhat akin to government
speech, where the government may control its own message. Granted,
the broadcasting stations are not owned by the government, but be-
cause of spectrum scarcity and governmental licensing of spectrum ac-
cess, speech through the airwaves is not purely that of the speaker, but
rather that of the speaker as mediated through the government.
The other case upholding a type of "must-carry" rule is PnmeYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.60 The California Supreme Court inter-
preted the California Constitution as requiring private shopping
center owners to permit others to engage in "speech and petitioning,
reasonably exercised, ' 61 even against the will of the shopping center
owner. The shopping center owners argued that "a private property
owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to
use his property as a forum for the speech of others."62 The United
States Supreme Court rejected this challenge, distinguishing Barnette,
Wooley, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,6 which had
held unconstitutional a state law granting a right of reply to newspa-
per attacks. Wooley, said the Court, involved a license plate on plain-
tiffs' personal car; the shopping center, to the contrary, is a "business
establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please.
58. Id. at 388.
59. The FCC has since abandoned the so-called "fairness doctrine," which in-
cluded the regulations at issue in Red Lion. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654,665 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Recently, the Court
stated that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied to federal regulations
requiring cable television systems to carry certain programming, and remanded the
case for further record development. See Trlmer Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994).
60. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
61. Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 85. The owners also advanced a takings claim, which the Court rejected.
Id. at 82-85.
63. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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The views expressed by members of the public in passing out pam-
phlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identi-
fied with those of the owner."'  Furthermore, because "no specific
message is dictated by the State," 65 there is "no danger of governmen-
tal discrimination for or against a particular message. 6 6 In addition,
the shopping center owner may "expressly disavow any connection
with the message."'67 Barnette, said the PruneYard Court, "is inappo-
site because it involved the compelled recitation of a message contain-
ing an affirmation of belief."'  Finally, the Court explained that
Tornillo "rests on the principle that the State cannot tell a newspaper
what it must print, ' 69 and that the right of reply statute might deter
"editors from publishing controversial political statements. ' 70
Whether these distinctions make sense is a matter I address in part
III.B, "Rethinking the Right Not to Speak."
The Court has ruled against the government in the other four cases
involving state action compelling one party to carry or foster the
speech of another. Tornillo, which I have already mentioned, invali-
dated under the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment a state
statute "granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to
criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper."'71 The Court held
that the "Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a
statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified mat-
ter.... The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content
of a newspaper. ' 72 To avoid triggering the right of reply statute, edi-
tors might avoid controversy. 73 The Court rejected the argument
(similar to the one made in Red Lion) that it is too difficult for at-
tacked citizens to reply through the print medium.74
Next, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,75 the Court ruled on
two constitutional challenges to "agency shop" agreements entered
into between a public employee union and a local government em-
ployer. The agreement required even nonunion employees to contrib-
ute a service fee in lieu of union dues, and the question was whether
compelling such a fee from nonunion members violated their constitu-
tional rights. 76 The Court held that nothing in the Constitution pre-
vented the union from using the compelled fee for collective




68. Id. at 88.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974).
72. Id. at 256.
73. Id. at 257.
74. Id. at 247-54.
75. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
76. Id. at 211.
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bargaining, but also ruled that the Constitution prevents the union
from "spending a part of [the] required service fees to contribute to
political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its du-
ties as exclusive bargaining representative."' "[A]t the heart of the
First Amendment," said the Court, "is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State."78 The Court did not rely specifically on the
Free Speech Clause; it did, though, state that "the freedom of an indi-
vidual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."79 The Court
cited only one of the prior right not to speak cases (Barnette), but
Abood arguably fits with them,80 for it is about government compel-
ling citizens to help foster ideas with which they disagree.81
Two cases remain. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission,82 the Court held that a State may not "require a pri-
vately owned utility company to include in its billing envelopes speech
of a third party with which the utility disagrees."s 3 The Court relied
primarily on the Free Speech Clause, but also referred to cognate Free
Press Clause principles. It held that the right of reply statute at issue
(the State had required the company to carry the message of a public
interest group called "Toward Utility Rate Normalization") "is anti-
thetical to the free discussion that the First Amendment seeks to fos-
ter. For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes
within it the choice of what not to say."' s The Court explained that in
PruneYard, there was no "concern that access to [the area open to the
public at large] might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of
his own right to speak,' 8s5 whereas here the Commission had ordered
the utility company to carry the public interest group's message four
times a year, thus depriving the company of that extra space in the
billing envelope.86 The Court also stated that "the relevant forum in
77. Id. at 234.
78. Id. at 234-35.
79. Id. at 233.
80. As do cases following Abood. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); cf.
Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (construing National
Labor Relations Act narrowly to avoid requiring nonunion members to pay fee that
could be used for noncollective bargaining purposes).
81. Granted, fostering objectionable ideas through compelled fees is different
from doing so through driving a car with a license plate motto with which one dis-
agrees, but so too is that action, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), different
from being forced to utter words with which one disagrees, see West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See infra part IfL.B, "Rethinking the Right
Not to Speak," in which I address these differences.
82. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 5-6.
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PruneYard was the open area of the shopping center into which the
general public was invited. This area was, almost by definition, pecu-
liarly public in nature."87
The most recent right not to speak case is Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.88 The state court had
ruled that the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade, a pri-
vate group, may not, under state anti-discrimination law, exclude a
gay and lesbian Irish-American group from the parade.8 9 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parade organizers have a
First Amendment right to exclude any message with which they disa-
gree.90 The use of state power to force the inclusion of the gay and
lesbian marchers (with whatever banners they would carry and
message that would send) "violates the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message." 91 The Court distinguished
PruneYard, explaining that the "principle of speaker's autonomy was
simply not threatened," because the shopping center was generally
open to the public, because the audience would not likely associate
the messages at issue with the shopping center's owners, and because
the owners could easily disavow any connection with the messages.92
Thus, treating Red Lion as a category unto itself (governmentally
controlled forum), the right not to speak cases line up coherently, ex-
cept for PruneYard, which the other cases are constantly at pains to
distinguish. The relevant issues in distinguishing PruneYard are the
public nature of the forum (albeit a privately-owned shopping center),
the lack of association between the messages in question and the fo-
rum's owners, and the opportunity for those owners to disavow any
connection between them and the messages. As I discuss in part III.B,
although these factors should be relevant in assessing the constitution-
ality of compelled expression, the Court has not always applied them
in a logical fashion. Moreover, the Court's failure to locate the pre-
cise constitutional obstacle to compelled speech-it refers at various
times to a right of self-determination, to the freedom of association, to
the freedom of speech, and to the freedom of the press-opens the
way for a fresh examination of the problem. In the end, I will suggest
a narrower scope for the right not to speak.
87. Id. at 12 n.8.
88. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
89. Id at 2342.
90. Id at 2350-51. I assume for purposes of argument that the Hurley Court cor-
rectly assumed (a) that the parade constituted private speech, and (b) that access to
the streets of Boston for a St. Patrick's Day Parade is in fact open to all comers
pursuant to neutral rules.
91. Id. at 2347.
92. Id. at 2350-51.
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III. SOLVING THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE PROBLEM
Regardless of the nuances of the school prayer and right not to
speak cases, we are left, after Barnene and its progeny and after Weis-
man, with a simple equation: When the government sponsors a group
utterance in public schools, psychological pressure is placed on stu-
dents either to participate in the utterance or to behave in such a way
that a reasonable observer would view them as participating. This
psychological pressure counts as coercion for constitutional analysis.
The government may not, under the Establishment Clause, coerce
people to pray, and it may not, under the Free Speech Clause (and
perhaps other constitutional provisions), coerce people to speak or
otherwise foster messages. Giving students the option not to partici-
pate in group utterances is insufficient, for the very existence of a gov-
ernment-led group utterance in public school is sufficiently coercive to
violate either the Establishment Clause or the Free Speech Clause.
Maybe this is a good result. Perhaps public schools should not be in
the business of leading group utterances of any kind, even with an opt-
out for dissenting students. Public schools engage in plenty of charac-
ter formation as it is, and many people find even that troublesome,
preferring a system in which all education is privatized or at least one
in which vouchers are available to opt out of the public school sys-
tem.93 The remainder of this Article, however, will assume without
demonstrating that there are good reasons to try to preserve the con-
stitutionality of a teacher-led pledge of allegiance in the public
schools.
A. Rejecting Psychological Coercion
A teacher-led pledge of allegiance in the public schools is, under
current Supreme Court doctrine, unconstitutional because of the con-
fluence of two strands of doctrine. Revising either one would save the
pledge. Here, I discuss discarding psychological coercion as relevant
to proving a constitutional violation. In the next section, I discuss re-
vising the right not to speak doctrine.
If we refuse to recognize psychological coercion as relevant to mak-
ing out a constitutional claim, we could still invalidate governmentally
sponsored prayer in public schools on a structural theory. As I ex-
plained above,94 the early school prayer cases (Engel and Schempp)
93. See, e.g., Stephen Axons, The Separation of Church and State: Pierce Recon-
sidered, 46 Harv. Educ. Rev. 76 (1976) (discussing parents' right to choose schools
where inculcation of values or beliefs is involved); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto (June 19, 1995 draft, on file with the author) (pro-
moting a strong parental rights view); Michael McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majori.
tarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to
Say?, 1991 U. Chi. Legal Forum 123, 126 (proposing a voucher system "in which par-
ents would be free to choose among available accredited schools").
94. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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relied on the argument that our Constitution adopts a prophylactic
device regarding governmental fostering of religion. We assume that
such sponsorship will lead to sectarian contests for public power, and
may also lead to the profanation of the religious. As constitutional
doctrine, invalidation of governmental sponsorship of religion is prop-
erly considered prophylactic, because plaintiff's claim does not de-
pend upon proving that the state action in question has already led to
sectarian contests for public power or to the profanation of religion.
Rather, the risk that such results will obtain is assumed, and the dan-
ger is headed off at the outset.
Although the Establishment Clause, thus, could be read as a struc-
tural right (similar to the separation of powers or federalism95 ), one
could still argue that coercion is constitutionally sufficient to prove a
Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause claim, and that psychological co-
ercion counts as coercion for constitutional purposes. The former
claim is certainly true: Government may not coerce prayer or speech
through the threat of legal sanction. But should psychological coer-
cion count as coercion for constitutional purposes? Justice Brennan,
concurring in Schempp, answered Yes:
[T]he excusal procedure itself necessarily operates in such a way as
to infringe the rights of free exercise of those children who wish to
be excused. We have held in Barnette ... that a State may [not]
require ... public school students.., to profess beliefs offensive to
religious principles. By the same token the State could not constitu-
tionally require a student to profess publicly his disbelief as the pre-
requisite to the exercise of his constitutional right of abstention....
[B]y requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and
schoolmates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of nonconform-
ity, the procedure may well deter those children who do not wish to
participate for any reason based upon the dictates of conscience
from exercising an indisputably constitutional right to be excused.
Thus the excusal provision in its operation subjects them to a cruel
dilemma. In consequence, even devout children may well avoid
claiming their right and simply continue to participate in exercises
distasteful to them because of an understandable reluctance to be
stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists simply on the basis of
their request.96
There are two arguments here. The first is about pressure to pro-
fess either belief or disbelief. The first step of this argument follows
from the right not to speak, regardless of its precise constitutional ba-
sis. The government may not force a citizen to choose between utter-
ing certain words and stating her disagreement with the message of
those words. For this choice deprives the citizen of a third option:
95. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmak-
ing, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994).
96. 374 U.S. at 288-90 (footnote omitted).
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remaining silent on the matter. The second step of the argument is far
from clear, however: Is nonparticipation in a group utterance "tanta-
mount in the eyes of teachers and schoolmates to a profession of dis-
belief, or at least of nonconformity?" Assuming students don't have
to give reasons for opting out, it seems wrong to equate a silent action
of nonparticipation with a compelled expression of disagreement with
the content of the group utterance.97
The second argument, though, is a strong one. Even if the action of
nonparticipation cannot be equated with a declaration of disbelief,
students undoubtedly feel strong pressure not to opt out, if only for
fear of being branded as weirdos or losers or otherwise ostracized.
Justice Brennan captures this when he writes that "even devout chil-
dren may well avoid claiming their right and simply continue to par-
ticipate in exercises distasteful to them because of an understandable
reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists simply on
the basis of their request.19 8 One way of challenging this conclusion
would be to require social science evidence of such peer pressure, or
to provide social science evidence concluding that school children do
not feel such peer pressure. But I will accept as well-founded the em-
pirical basis for the claim that children will feel extraordinary pressure
to participate in any group activity, including group utterances. More
interesting is the question whether the existence of such pressure
should matter for constitutional analysis.
One argument against considering psychological coercion constitu-
tionally relevant is that line-drawing is difficult. Surely many college
students and adults feel pressure to conform; should the government
be constitutionally prohibited from leading the pledge of allegiance or
the national anthem during public university graduations or football
games, or during town meetings? Another argument is that we should
not assume that all school children will feel psychologically coerced;
instead, we should wait for as-applied challenges. But the strongest
argument against making psychological coercion relevant for constitu-
tional analysis involves detaching the government from the psycholog-
ical coercion: The government is banned from coercing prayer or
speech through legal sanction, but so long as the government grants
an option out of such an utterance, it is off the hook. The psychologi-
cal coercion that students undoubtedly feel to participate in group ut-
terances is not properly attributable to the government, even though it
was the government's decision to have its agents (the teachers) lead
the group utterance. Rather, the psychological coercion is attributa-
ble to the student's peers, and they are not "the State." The Constitu-
tion should not be extended past clear instances of state action.
97. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in
Weisman).
98. 374 U.S. at 290.
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This argument against deeming psychological coercion constitution-
ally relevant fits with the Court's general reluctance to attribute pri-
vate conduct to the State. The Court consistently has rejected claims
that the Constitution requires the government to fund citizens in the
exercise of their constitutional rights.99 Even though the refusal to
fund is state action, the lack of money is seen as proximately caused
not by the government, but by private forces. So it is with peer pres-
sure. (That is, assuming the government's agents-the teachers-
don't penalize the nonconforming students.) In addition, the Court
has demanded that federal courts cease jurisdiction over desegrega-
tion cases once the causal nexus between segregation and governmen-
tal action is no longer clear."°° But however powerful the doctrinal
argument against the constitutional relevance of psychological coer-
cion, Justice Brennan's argument in Schempp'0 and Justice Ken-
nedy's argument in Weisman'0° are, still, hard to rebut. When the
government places students in the position of participating in a group
utterance or opting out, the pressure to participate is overwhelming.
To say that the only proximate cause of the coercion is one's peers and
not also the government is correct only on a narrow view of proximate
cause.1 0 3 Thus, although the Court could, with fairly strong doctrinal
consistency, eliminate psychological coercion as constitutionally rele-
vant (thus saving the pledge of allegiance in public schools), this does
not seem the best course. But if we continue to accept psychological
coercion as constitutionally relevant, then how can we avoid stripping
the public schools of the power to lead the pledge? For under the
Court's doctrine, governmental coercion invalidates both prayer and
pledge, and there's nothing in the Court's doctrine to indicate that
psychological coercion should invalidate the former but not the latter.
The answer, provided in the next section, requires reevaluating the
right not to speak and understanding it as a right of autonomy or per-
sonhood that is violated only by the threat of legal sanction.
99. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (uphold-
ing a statute prohibiting the use of public facilities for abortions); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that states need not fund medically necessary abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a state regulation limiting Medicaid
benefits to medically necessary first trimester abortions).
100. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (permitting a federal court
to order state remedies for segregation only to the extent of state responsibility);
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (stating that it is "beyond the authority" of the
federal courts to counteract segregation arising from changes in demographics);
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (judicial determination of a school
district's compliance with the Equal Protection Clause would be sufficient to lift or
modify a desegregation decree). See also Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and 7wo Mis-
takes About Equality, 96 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996).
101. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
102. See supra part I.B.
103. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)(Rehnquist, CJ. and Brennan, J., debating proximate cause and governmental re-
sponsibilities under the Due Process Clause).
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B. Rethinking the Right Not to Speak
1. The Nonexpressiveness of Compelled Speech
The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause covers more than
merely "speech," literally understood. The guarantee covers, more
broadly, acts of expression; as Thomas Scanlon put it, it applies to acts
"intended by [their] agent to communicate to one or more persons
some proposition or attitude."'' 10 The Supreme Court has agreed that
the Free Speech Clause covers nonlinguistic, symbolic expressive
acts.'1 5 But does the clause cover less than "speech," literally under-
stood? That is, if the clause is construed functionally, to cover all ex-
pressive acts, should this functional definition be applied in reverse, to
exclude from the clause's coverage nonexpressive acts, even if
linguistic? 106
The proposition I will defend here is this: For an act to be consid-
ered expressive, and thus worthy of prima facie protection under the
Free Speech Clause, that act must involve (or appear to a reasonable
observer to involve) the communication of the speaker's internal
mental state, such as her beliefs, attitudes, or convictions. Thus, the
right to speak is the right to express beliefs, to reveal one's mind pub-
licly. As a corollary to this right, the right not to speak is the right not
to reveal one's mind publicly.
A law that compels a person to speak certain words does not re-
quire that she reveal her mind publicly. To be sure, such a law re-
quires the use of the mind, insofar as the speaker must choose
whether to respond to the legal command and engage in whatever
cognitive process is necessary to form and say the required words.
But this use of the mind in responding to legal obligation is no differ-
ent from the use of the mind in responding to legal obligation not
involving words. The mind is used in deciding whether to signal a left
turn, and then in signaling the turn. Neither a law compelling the ut-
terance of the pledge of allegiance nor a law compelling a left turn
signal requires the agent to reveal the contents of her mind, to share
with others what is "on her mind." As Meir Dan-Cohen has pointed
out in a different context, "Detached speech is an essentially imper-
sonal production: It is externally motivated, and being exempt from
104. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. AL. 204,
206 (1972).
105. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating law prohibiting
the burning of the United States flag, as applied to a political protest).
106. When I talk about the "coverage" of the Free Speech Clause, I refer to state
action properly considered to implicate concerns of the Clause. When I talk about
the "protection" of the Clause, I refer to a determination in a given case that speech is
protected under the Clause. Thus, to say that speech is "prima facie protected" under
the Clause means that it is "covered" by the Clause, and that we must still explore
whether the government's reasons for regulating the speech in question are suffi-
ciently strong to overcome the citizen's prima facie case.
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the requirement of sincerity, it is avowedly cut off from the speaker's
own identity and psychological state."' 7
For compelled speech to be nonexpressive, and thus not covered by
the Free Speech Clause, a reasonable observer must know that the
speech act was compelled. If a reasonable observer views the act in
such a fashion, then she knows that the uttered words are not neces-
sarily reflective of the speaker's thoughts. If a reasonable observer
would understand the speech as reflective of the speaker's beliefs
(that is, if she would not view the speech as compelled), then even
though the speech was in fact compelled by law, it should be deemed
expressive and covered by the Free Speech Clause. But so long as the
speech act is compelled and is known by a reasonable observer to be
compelled,108 it would be unreasonable for such an observer to view
the message contained in the communication as necessarily a revela-
tion of the speaker's beliefs. Rather, a reasonable observer who
knows the speech was compelled should believe that the speaker was
merely following the law, which happened to involve a speech act.
Whether the speaker also believes the content of the utterance is
merely coincidental, and does not affect the characterization of the
speech act as "following the law" rather than "expressing one's be-
liefs." Furthermore, it would be wrong for the reasonable observer to
conclude that because the speaker could have disobeyed the law and
suffered the penalty, her utterance is thereby expressive. It is more
reasonable to believe that she did not want to suffer the penalty.
Obeying the law to avoid suffering a penalty is no more an expressive
act if the obedience takes the form of an utterance than if it takes the
form of a nonverbal action.
Whether a reasonable observer would understand that the words of
a speech act were compelled by law, and would thus dissociate the
content of the speech from the individual speaker, is a factual, case-
by-case matter.10 9 Additionally, if in a particular case a reasonable
observer would not understand the speech as compelled, and would,
instead, associate its content with the speaker, the government may
not avoid bringing the Free Speech Clause into play by arguing that all
the speaker need do is explain that she is being compelled to speak.
That speech act does reveal something about the speaker's beliefs,
and the government may not, under the Free Speech Clause, require
such a disclosure. If the speech were reasonably understood
(although, by hypothesis, incorrectly) as noncompelled, and therefore
107. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Com-
munications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1229, 1241
(1991).
108. I leave aside the complex situation in which a speech act not in fact compelled
is nevertheless viewed by the reasonable observer as compelled.
109. But see David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government
Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 995, 1005 (1982) (assuming
that others will perceive compelled speech as sincere).
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as revealing something about the speaker's beliefs, then the compelled
speech is presumptively invalid under the Free Speech Clause.
Finally, the Court and commentators have been wrong to suggest
that compelled speech constitutes an "affirmation," or a "declara-
tion," or the "expression of a view."' 10 Those terms all apply, to be
sure, to compelled speech that is reasonably understood as revealing
the speaker's beliefs. But if a reasonable observer would understand
the speech as dissociated from the speaker, then the speech affirms
nothing, declares nothing, and expresses nothing. It merely follows
the law, which involves the saying of words. Again, there might be, in
some cases, something terribly constitutionally wrong with the govern-
ment compelling such empty speech. But the Free Speech Clause is
the wrong hook on which to hang a constitutional claim here. Some-
times the Court and commentators appreciate this, if only dimly. For
example, in Wooley v. Maynard"' (the "Live Free or Die" license
plate motto case), the Court talked of a "right to decline to foster"
certain concepts."12 But once we understand that the problem in-
volves the "fostering" of messages rather than the "affirmation" or
"expression" of views, then it will be easier to move from the Free
Speech Clause to a different set of principles, involving autonomy and
personhood. I discuss those below, in part III.B.5.
110. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (referring to
Barnette and Wooley as involving "compelled expression"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) ("[Were the government] freely able to
compel [corporate] speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree,
... the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they
deny in the next."), quoted in Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338,2348 (1995); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 631 (1943) ("compulsion of students to declare a belief"); id. at 633 ("re-
quires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind"); id. at 642 ("force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein"); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith
101 (1988) (required pledge of allegiance is "a peculiarly American form of the loy-
alty oath"); id. at 102 ("Barnette's 'fixed star' is almost invariably cited whenever the
state tries to require its employees to take loyalty oaths indicating their commitment
to certain beliefs); David AJ. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 130, 166 n.3
(1986) (Barnette and Wooley involved "compulsory expression"); Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 804 (2d ed. 1988) (Barnette's lesson is that "forcing
someone to express a view is as offensive as forbidding someone to express it"); id. at
1303 (Barnette and Wooley involve "the choice of symbols one publicly endorses"); id.
at 1315 (law in Barnette compels one "to express beliefs and convictions"); Thomas I.
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 Ga. L Rev. 795, 833 n.45
(1981) (government may not "compel affirmation of a belief"); David B. Gaebler,
supra note 109, at 1005 (individual likely to view his own compelled speech as an
"outright affirmation of... the views involuntarily expressed"); id. at 1010 (in Bar-
nette government has "clearly compelled expression"); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith:
Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 Conn. L Rev. 739, 772
(1986) (law in Barnette compelled belief); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
UCLA L. Rev. 565, 590 n.131 (1980) (law in Barnette required people "to affirm in
public ceremonies beliefs that [they do] not hold").
111. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
112. Id. at 714.
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2. The Issue of Dissent
Even if the speech act is reasonably understood as compelled, the
government might still presumptively violate the Free Speech Clause
by closing off dissent. Thus, critical to compelled speech remaining
outside the coverage of the Free Speech Clause is that the government
leave open channels for dissent to the very message it is compelling.
Closing off dissent violates the core of the Free Speech Clause by
shutting down the public communication of one's beliefs, 1 3 as seen in
cases such as Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,"4 Texas v. Johnson,"' and Cohen v. California."6
Now it is true that a law compelling the recitation of the pledge of
allegiance has the effect of curtailing a certain type of expressive act:
A student would be prohibited from remaining silent to express her
disapproval of the pledge; she would have to choose another means to
express such disapproval. But this is merely a byproduct of the law;
the law's purpose is not to stifle dissent. That a law covers some ex-
pressive conduct is not sufficient to invalidate it if it is not directed at
such conduct. The Supreme Court has upheld such laws of so-called
"general applicability."'"17
The stifling of dissent is precisely what distinguishes the religious
test and loyalty oath cases-and other analogous scenarios" 8-from a
compelled pledge of allegiance. For example, consider Torcaso v.
Watkins." 9 The Court invalidated Maryland's religious test that "was
113. Cf. Steven M. Shiffrin, The ]First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance(1990) (discussing the image of the dissenter as an organizing symbol for the free
speech doctrine).
114. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (invalidating regulation prohibiting wearing black arm-
bands to school).
115. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating law prohibiting desecration of the United
States flag).
116. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (government may not prohibit citizen from wearing jacket
with words "Fuck the Draft" in the public corridors of a courthouse).
117. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding law prohib-
iting destruction of draft cards because its purpose was not the suppression of free
speech); see also Scanlon, supra note 104, at 209 (stating that the focus must be on
government's justifications for its restrictions, not on the restrictions themselves).
118. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 n.13
(1943) (citations omitted):
Early Christians were frequently persecuted for their refusal to participate in
ceremonies before the statue of the emperor or other symbol of imperial
authority. The story of William Tell's sentence to shoot an apple off his son's
head for refusal to salute a bailiff's hat is an ancient one.... The Quakers,
William Penn included, suffered punishment rather than uncover their heads
in deference to any civil authority.
One could add other references: The Spanish Inquisition during which the Jews
were forced to convert, flee, or die; the Hamen and Esther story from the Bible in
which Esther refused to bow down to Hamen. What makes all these stories similar,
and in the loyalty oath category, is that required speech is accompanied by forbidden
dissent.
119. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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designed to... bar every person who refuses to declare a belief in
God from holding a public 'office of profit or trust' in Maryland."' "
An atheist who desired such an office had the following choices: (1)
Lie, take the oath, get the job, and say nothing further about her theis-
tic beliefs. (2) Not take the oath, and forfeit the job. The atheist did
not have the following option: (3) Take the oath, get the job, and then
state, "I don't really believe in God." Such a statement would forfeit
the job. In such cases, the government is not interested merely in
compelling speech regardless of whether it matches the true beliefs of
the speaker (as was the case in Barnette and Wooley). Rather, the
government is interested in ferreting out the speaker's true beliefs,
and denying certain benefits if those beliefs are the wrong ones. Thus,
laws requiring statements of belief as a prerequisite to receiving a gov-
ernment benefit are quite different from laws such as a compelled
pledge of allegiance. The former do not permit dissent; the latter do.
Whether one would feel comfortable dissenting from compelled
speech immediately, or only in a different setting, should not alter the
analysis. For example, school children might well feel pressure not to
dissent immediately after the saying of the pledge; similarly, most
adults would be unlikely to display a protest to the United States at a
town meeting immediately after the singing of the national anthem. A
few points are important here. First, I am assuming now that a rea-
sonable observer would understand the speech act as compelled, and
thus not expressive. So the speech act is, on my argument above, not
covered by the Free Speech Clause. Second, turning to the stifling of
dissent claim (another way to bring the Free Speech Clause back into
the picture), psychological pressure not to dissent in a particular set-
ting should not be sufficient to make out a Free Speech Clause claim,
so long as other avenues for dissent are open. Indeed, the Court has
permitted direct regulation of certain types of communication, so long
as alternative channels of expression remain open.12'
What of the fact that by compelling a speech act the government
forces the speaker to take an action to dissent? Doesn't this take
away an important option, namely, the option to say nothing? This
argument confuses compelled speech that is reasonably understood as
that of the speaker (and thus as expressive) with compelled speech
that is reasonably understood as compelled (and thus as nonexpres-
sive). Assuming the latter obtains (for if the former does, the Free
Speech Clause is thereby brought into play), the speaker need not dis-
sent to dispel any notion that the utterance was representative of her
120. Id. at 489-90. Although I use the example of a religious test case, my point
here is not limited to the context of religious belief
121. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding
prohibition on posting of signs on public utility poles); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San




beliefs. For if a reasonable observer understands the utterance as
compelled, then the observer also understands that the utterance is
not necessarily representative of the speaker's beliefs. Whether the
speaker wants to take the further action of registering dissent to the
message of the compelled utterance is, thus, identical to whether any
citizen wants to dissent to any law.
3. The Self-Incrimination Analogy
It might be helpful to draw on an analogy to another area of consti-
tutional law responsive to governmental attempts to coerce speech.
To gain the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, one must show that a statement is (a) compelled by the
government, (b) incriminating, and (c) testimonial." For a statement
to be testimonial, it must "relate a factual assertion or disclose infor-
mation."' 23 Thus, requiring someone to say words that do not reveal
the contents of the mind does not implicate the privilege. To take an
easy case, a voice exemplar used to identify a voice is not testimonial
because the government is not interested in what the speaker chooses
to say.124
A more difficult case, which is helpful in considering the pledge of
allegiance problem, is Doe v. United States.12 5 The United States de-
sired access to Doe's bank records from the Cayman Islands, but Doe
refused to answer questions about certain records and, pursuant to
Cayman Islands law, the banks refused to disclose any-records without
Doe's consent. So the United States compelled Doe to sign the fol-
lowing form:
I... do hereby direct any bank... at which I may have a bank
account.., to disclose all information and deliver copies of all doc-
uments ... in your possession or control which relate to said bank
account ... and this shall be irrevocable authority for so doing. This
direction has been executed pursuant to that certain order of the
United States District Court .... This direction ... shall be con-
strued as consent with respect [to Cayman Islands law]. 126
In holding the statement to be nontestimonial in nature,2 7 the Court
held, "Because the directive explicitly indicates that it was signed pur-
suant to a court order, Doe's compelled execution of the form sheds
122. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988).
123. Id. at 210. See also Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrim-
ination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 Yale J.L. & Hum. 149, 154 (1990)("[T]he statement must require her to employ her cognitive faculties to relate some
factual assertion or disclose information.").
124. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
125. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
126. Id. at 204 n.2.
127. There are obvious difficulties in the government's attempting to pass off a co-
erced statement as consent, and, indeed, the Cayman Islands government maintained
that "a compelled consent... is not sufficient to authorize the release of confidential
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no light on his actual intent or state of mind."' The same analysis
should apply to Free Speech Clause challenges to governmentally
compelled utterances: If it is clear that the utterance is made pursuant
to governmental directive, then a person's execution of that directive
also "sheds no light on his actual intent or state of mind."
The Fifth Amendment privilege cases can be analogized as well to
the loyalty oath cases. The privilege prevents the government from
building a criminal case through the mind of the accused, by helping
to avoid the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt."' 9 A person faced with stating publicly a loyalty oath that she
does not believe, as a condition to receiving a government job, is faced
with a similar "cruel trilemma." She can admit that she is not loyal,
and lose the job (similar to "self-accusation"); she can take the oath
and refuse to disavow it publicly, thus stifling her dissent and project-
ing a false image (similar to "perjury"); or she can refuse to respond
to the request for an oath, leading as well to the loss of the job (similar
to "contempt"). When a person is forced to make a potentially in-
criminating testimonial statement, she has to share her thoughts and
beliefs with the government (and some of those thoughts and beliefs
might lead to criminal conviction); loyalty oaths similarly require the
sharing of a person's real thoughts and beliefs. Both types of compul-
sion are different from compelling a linguistic act that does not reveal
anything about the speaker's mind, that is properly considered nonex-
pressive, and that is therefore not covered by the Free Speech Clause.
4. Compelled Speech Triggered by Expression
Compelled speech might violate the Free Speech Clause for a rea-
son unconnected to anything I have discussed so far. If the govern-
ment conditions compelled speech on the speaker's expression, the
law might be sufficiently nonneutral to violate the Free Speech
Clause. For example, consider two laws, one that requires all partici-
pants at a town meeting to sing the national anthem, the other that
requires only those adults who are wearing protest buttons to sing the
national anthem. Assuming that a reasonable observer would under-
stand the singing as compelled in each instance (and thus as nonex-
pressive), and assuming avenues of dissent to the town's actions are
open to all, the Free Speech Clause would not be violated under
either of the principles I have discussed above. But, obviously, the
second hypothetical law is constitutionally infirm under the Free
Speech Clause. Importantly, it is infirm not because of what it re-
quires, but because of the triggering condition for that requirement.
The law would be just as invalid if it required only those adults who
financial records," id. at 218 n.16, making one wonder why the United States persisted
in its efforts.
128. Id. at 216.
129. Id. at 212 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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are wearing protest buttons to pay extra, leave the meeting, or eat ice
cream. Unless the government has a compelling interest, it may not
disproportionately burden those who are engaging in a certain form of
expression.
Some of the right not to speak cases involve compelled speech trig-
gered in a nonneutral way. What is troublesome about the state ac-
tion in those cases is not, however, that the government has violated
the right not to speak. Rather, what renders the state action in those
cases invalid under the Free Speech Clause is that the government has
burdened a selected group of speakers without adequate justification.
This point will become clearer when I go through the cases again in
part III.B.6.
5. The Autonomy/Personhood Argument
We should assume now a category of laws with the following char-
acteristics: (a) The government has compelled speech. (b) A reason-
able observer would know that the speech was compelled, and thus
that the words spoken do not necessarily reflect the speaker's beliefs.
(c) Channels of dissent are open. (d) The government has not placed
the compelled speech burden in an unjustified, nonneutral fashion on
a selected group of persons. The sum of my arguments above suggests
that whatever else we might say about laws that satisfy these four cri-
teria, they should not be thought to raise Free Speech Clause
problems. An example might be the one I gave in the previous sec-
tion: a town meeting that requires all in attendance to sing the na-
tional anthem. Here, (a) the speech is governmentally compelled, (b)
assume that all reasonable observers would understand that the song
is compelled, and thus that the words sung do not necessarily reflect
the singers' beliefs, (c) nothing in the hypothetical indicates any re-
striction on dissent, and (d) the burden has been placed on all in at-
tendance, rather than on an unjustifiable subgroup. But even if I am
correct in arguing that the Free Speech Clause is the wrong constitu-
tional avenue for a challenge here, one might still maintain that the
government may not constitutionally require the singing of the na-
tional anthem. What is the appropriate constitutional source for this
claim?
In many cases, not always linked, the Court has read the Constitu-
tion to deprive government of the power to place great intrusions on
autonomy, or personhood. These terms are necessarily vague, for the
line between legitimate governmental regulation and unconstitutional
governmental regulation is hard to draw. The cases I refer to include:
Roe v. Wade 130 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey13 1 (right to abortion
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
131. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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before fetal viability); Griswold v. Connecticut"3 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird33 (right to purchase and use birth control); Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health31 (right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition; dicta); Meyer v. Nebraska131 (right to teach children a
foreign language); Rochin v. California'35 (right against unconsented
stomach pumping); Turner v. Safley137 (right of prisoners to marry);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland"3 (right of nonnuclear family mem-
bers to live in one house). The cases may be and have been theorized
in many ways, but what they have in common is a strong personal
claim of liberty counterposed against a weak justification for govern-
mental regulation. My proposal here is that compelled speech cases,
absent the Free Speech Clause hooks I have described above, should
be seen as autonomy or personhood cases, like the ones just listed. 39
Just as it would be hard to justify a governmental requirement that
everyone wear blue on Fridays, or that everyone eat ice cream once a
week, so is it hard to justify a governmental requirement that every-
one say the pledge of allegiance. The concern in the pledge of alle-
giance situation, thus, is centered not on the speech involved, but
rather on the intrusion on and insult to the person' 4 and the weak-
ness of the regulatory need. The category is not "right not to speak"
but rather "right against intrusive, insulting, thinly justified govern-
mental action," which can be violated by compelled speech as well as
by compelled actions (or compelled inaction) that have nothing to do
with speech. Obviously there will be enormously difficult line-draw-
ing problems, and there are important arguments as to why the Court
should never have developed this "substantive due process" line of
cases to begin with. But the cases exist, and although I will not at-
tempt here an extended theoretical justification for them, others have
132. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
134. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
135. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
136. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
137. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
138. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
139. See Tribe, supra note 110, at 1303-04, 1314-18; Gaebler, supra note 109, at
1004 (describing infringement, in the right not to speak setting, of "the individual's
interest in selfhood").
140. The intrusion on and insult to the person, in the pledge setting, might be
linked to the association many of us have between compelled utterances and freedom
of speech. That would seem to indicate that the Free Speech Clause is the appropri-
ate constitutional provision for challenging compelled utterances. If a reasonable ob-
server would understand that the speech act was compelled, however, and assuming
that dissent is open and that the law applies to citizens neutrally, then the nature of
the harm to the person seems less like the harm resulting from forbidden expression




presented strong arguments for their place in our constitutional
fabric.14 1
This autonomy right should be limited in a few important respects.
One is that it should be considered a right of the person, and not of
corporate entities. Another is that the nature of the regulatory intru-
sion must be direct on the person, intrusive or insulting or demeaning
in what we would agree is a personal, almost bodily way.'4 ' These
limitations will help explain, in the next section, why compelling cor-
porate speech is not invalid, and why compelling speech in a detached
way, such as using tax money for governmental propaganda, is also
not invalid as unconstitutional compelled expression or as an uncon-
stitutional infringement of an autonomy/personhood right. Finally, as
part of the limitation of the right to direct harm to the person, laws
that enable psychological pressure from fellow citizens but that do not
legally coerce the person should not be included in the right of auton-
omy/personhood. I say more about this, by way of bringing the dis-
cussion full circle, in part III.B.7.
6. Application to the Cases
Barnette. Would a reasonable observer understand the teacher-led
pledge of allegiance, with no opt-out provision, as compelled and thus
as not reflective of the beliefs of the students? The reasonable ob-
server must be someone who is present at the scene, not some hypo-
thetical average person. So the question must be whether a
reasonable student, participating in the saying of the pledge of alle-
giance, would understand that the content of the pledge does not nec-
essarily reflect the beliefs of any student? This includes a student's
understanding of her own beliefs as well as of others' beliefs. Even
young students understand the difference between a show and tell
project (for example), which reflects the individuality and choice of a
fellow student, and a teacher-led pledge of allegiance in which all stu-
dents participate and say the same words. It would be unreasonable
for even a young student to think that the message of the pledge of
allegiance necessarily reflects the beliefs of her fellow students. She
might, of course, think that most or all of the students share the patri-
otic values of the pledge, but that is not the test. The test is whether a
reasonable observer would understand that a speech act was com-
pelled by the government (here, represented in the teacher).
Whether dissent is available is a difficult question. Certainly most
young children would not feel comfortable dissenting to the pledge's
141. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative
Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming 1995); James E. Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
142. In some of the cases-affecting, for example, abortion rights and the right to
die-we can drop the "almost" from the preceding sentence.
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message in the classroom setting. But we should not underestimate
the ability of children to speak their minds on controversial issues if
the children are old enough to have dissenting opinions on such issues.
And even if dissent is not likely to occur in the classroom setting, the
child would be free of the classroom pressure to dissent outside the
classroom setting. 43 As discussed earlier, 44 that is sufficient to over-
come the Free Speech Clause challenge.
The required pledge in Bamette is not triggered by the expression of
a particular group, so we are left without a Free Speech Clause argu-
ment. But Bamette is the best case in the so-called "right not to
speak" area for the autonomy/personhood argument. Compelling
people through threat of legal sanction to say words that they don't
want to say is as much an affront to dignity as many other laws the
Court has invalidated. The long-term harm might be less here than
from outlawing abortion or birth control, but the insult is clear and the
governmental interest in accomplishing its result (inculcating patriot-
ism) through this particular means (compulsory pledge) is low.
Wooley. Of the cases in this group holding against the government,
this one is most clearly wrong. A reasonable observer would under-
stand that the license plate motto is the State's message, not the May-
nards' message. Furthermore, the Maynards are completely free to
dissent to the "Live Free or Die" message in any number of ways.
Also, the requirement is for all license plates, not a subgroup of car-
owners who are already engaging in a form of expression. So the Free
Speech Clause has no place here. 45
Although the Maynards are individuals, and not a corporation, the
autonomy/personhood argument seems weak. The Maynards are not
forced to speak certain words, or wear certain buttons or badges. The
insult or affront from driving a car with a disagreeable license-plate
motto is small; the message that is fostered is detached from the per-
sons fostering it. So I conclude not only that the Free Speech Clause
claim fails, but that the autonomy/personhood claim fails as well.
People such as the Maynards might still bring a Free Exercise
Clause claim, arguing that even though the law in question is a reli-
gion-neutral one of general applicability, it conflicts with religious ten-
ets. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, this claim would lose,146
but there are many critics of this doctrine,147 and the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") might well give people such as
143. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 663-64 (1943)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
144. See supra text accompanying note 121.
145. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 719-22 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
146. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
147. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
Yale LU. 1611 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. Chl L. Rev. 1109 (1990).
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the Maynards relief in a case such as this. 48 Note that on either argu-
ment-Free Exercise Clause or RFRA-individuals with religious ob-
jections will prevail while individuals with nonreligious objections will
lose.
Red Lion. This remains a special case; if we accept the empirical
predicate of spectrum scarcity and governmental control of the broad-
cast spectrums, 49 then it makes sense to permit the government to
attach certain conditions to licenses to prevent certain speakers from
gaining a type of monopoly.
PruneYard. The case seems correctly decided. A reasonable ob-
server would not associate the message of various speakers in the
shopping center with the owners of the shopping center, and those
owners have many avenues to dissent from disliked messages. Fur-
thermore, the access requirement is not triggered by any expression of
the owners. So there is no Free Speech Clause claim.
The autonomy/personhood claim fails as well, because the owners
are suing in a corporate capacity, and because the speech that benefits
from the law is only loosely attached to the owners. Whether the
Court was correct to reject the takings claim is a matter I do not
address.
Tornillo. The compelled speech here-reply by those personally at-
tacked in the newspaper-is clearly dissociated from the newspaper;
any article that would run pursuant to the statute would undoubtedly
bear some sort of disclaimer from the newspaper. Without the dis-
claimer, a reasonable observer might connect the reply with the news-
paper, but the nature of a reply to a personal attack is such that it
should usually be fairly clear that the one writing the reply is not the
one who made the original personal attack. The newspaper has plenty
of opportunity, of course, to express dissenting views. Any autonomy/
personhood argument should fail; the newspaper is a corporate entity,
and there is no insult or affront to particular persons as persons when
the newspaper is forced to carry a reply.
But Tornillo is an excellent example of a Free Speech Clause claim
based on the triggering mechanism for the compelled speech. The
right of reply statute is triggered by certain speech only-criticism and
attacks on the record of a political candidate. 150 Thus, regardless of
what penalty a newspaper must face for printing such criticism and
attacks, the Free Speech (and Free Press) Clause would be implicated.
For example, suppose the State had enacted a law requiring newspa-
pers to pay $1000 to all candidates it criticized or attacked. That
would be unconstitutional even though the State did not require the
newspaper to carry any speech. It would be unconstitutional because
148. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
149. See supra note 59.
150. See Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974).
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the newspaper is being sanctioned for engaging in a particular kind of
otherwise protected speech. (Here, speech of the highest order-
political speech.) The fact that Florida chose to sanction the newspa-
per by requiring it to carry a reply from the candidate is not what
makes the state action unconstitutional; the law is unconstitutional not
for what it requires, specifically, but because the requirement is trig-
gered by protected speech.
Abood. This is a difficult case. On the one hand, a reasonable ob-
server would not associate the union's political speech with nonunion
members who are compelled to pay service fees in lieu of union dues.
Furthermore, those members have complete freedom to dissent from
any disagreeable union speech. In addition, the speech fostered
against the plaintiffs' wishes is not connected to the plaintiffs in a way
that gives rise to an autonomy/personhood objection. In many ways,
the law in Abood operates as many tax and spend programs do. For
example, the United States collects taxes from all who earn income,
and spends some of that money on speech, such as the National En-
dowment for Democracy ("NED") and the National Endowment for
the Arts ("NEA"). Regardless of what one thinks about these pro-
grams as a matter of policy, there is nothing clearly unconstitutional
about the government spending money in this way. But if it is consti-
tutional to spend tax money on messages that certain taxpayers reject,
then why is it unconstitutional to spend union service fees on
messages certain fee payers reject?
Still, there is something troubling about requiring people who
would rather not be union members at all to pay not only for collec-
tive bargaining (which is in their long-term economic interest), but
also for union political speech. Recall that the service fees were used
in part to "contribute to political candidates and to express political
views unrelated to [the Union's] duties as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative."'' The compelled speech, therefore, is often politically
partisan in nature. Does that fact, however, distinguish expenditures
for the NED and the NEA? Surely those projects often advance
messages that are politically partisan; the first, advancing democracy
over, say, socialism; the second, supporting in individual cases art with
blatantly political messages. Perhaps the problem is that the plaintiffs
in Abood are being singled out for fees; they are a smaller, more dis-
crete class than all American taxpayers who must support the NED
and the NEA. Or, perhaps, I have gotten the argument backwards,
and Abood should be considered a clear instance of a constitutional
problem that exists as well with regard to the NED and the NEA. I
leave further discussion of this tax and spend category for another
day.
151. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
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Pacific Gas. A reasonable observer would understand that the pub-
lie interest group's message contained in the utility company's bill is
not that of the utility company. Further, the company has many ave-
nues of dissent open. And, because the company is a corporate entity,
arguments from autonomy/personhood do not obtain.
But, as with Tornillo, the company can argue that the compelled
speech requirement was triggered in a way that was not itself neutral
toward expression. This argument is trickier here than in Tornillo,
which involved a state statute granting a right of reply to all attacked
political candidates. Here, the public interest group's speech was
compelled by the state utility commission, which issued an order re-
quiring the utility company to carry the public interest group's speech
four times a year (billing is monthly). One could argue that the com-
mission's order has nothing to do with the utility company's speech,
but resulted from a more general conclusion that the public would
benefit from the public interest group's views. But that is not how the
case came about. It arose because the utility company included vari-
ous messages in the billing envelope every month, and because the
public interest group objected to these messages. Rather than pro-
hibit the messages outright, the commission devised its sharing plan,
permitting the utility company to use the extra envelope space eight
times a year, and granting the public interest group access the remain-
ing four months. As litigated, therefore, Pacific Gas involves com-
pelled speech triggered by speech itself, and this violates the Free
Speech Clause. (At least presumptively. The case raises some diffi-
cult questions about the utility company's monopoly access to utility
consumers, and therefore looks a bit like Red Lion. I express no view
on whether that is the appropriate analogy.)
Hurley. This might be the only case properly decided as a right not
to speak case. The Court stated that the gay and lesbian marchers'
participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the
Council's customary determination about a unit admitted to the
parade, that its message was worthy of presentation and quite possi-
bly of support as well .... Although each parade unit generally
identifies itself, each is understood to contribute something to a
common theme, and accordingly there is no customary practice
whereby private sponsors disavow "any identity of viewpoint" be-
tween themselves and the selected participants. Practice follows
practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in a
moving parade .... Without deciding on the precise significance of
the likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in
the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the
parade's overall message is distilled from the individual presenta-
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tions along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spec-
tators as part of the whole.15
On this logic, which seems correct,15 3 a reasonable observer would
connect the parade organizers to all messages included in the parade.
(This assumes lack of knowledge of the litigation underlying the
parade, which involved a court order admitting the gay and lesbian
marchers.)
7. The Pledge of Allegiance, with an Opt-Out Provision
We can now return to the case of a teacher-led pledge of allegiance
in public school, with an opt-out provision for students who don't wish
to participate. Assuming that the message of the pledge is not reason-
ably associated with the minds of participating students, and assuming
a fair opportunity for dissent, even though such dissent might not oc-
cur in the classroom, the Free Speech Clause does not come into play.
Also, there is no compelled speech triggered in a nonneutral way by
expression itself. 54 So far, the analysis tracks my analysis of Barnette.
Barnette, of course, involved a pledge of allegiance compelled through
threat of legal sanction, and I have argued that this violates the auton-
omy/personhood rights of students who would prefer not to partici-
pate. Can we say the same if students are given the option not to
participate, and the pressure they feel is psychological rather than
from the threat of legal coercion?
The autonomy/personhood argument should be reserved for direct
threats of legal coercion, and not extended to cases of psychological
pressure, even if we attribute such pressure ultimately to the govern-
ment. The autonomy/personhood right involves an intrusion on or in-
sult to the person, a dignitary harm. When the government makes
abortion or birth control illegal, for example, such a harm has been
worked. But when the government permits such behavior while exert-
ing extralegal pressure against the individual not to engage in it, the
same sort of harm to the person does not exist. This is reflected in the
abortion decisions. Although the Court has read the Constitution to
forbid the government from banning abortion before fetal viability,
the Court has permitted government to place other forms of pressure
on women to choose childbirth over abortion. Thus, the Court has
upheld laws that require waiting periods before abortions and that re-
quire abortion providers to give to women seeking abortions informa-
tion about the hazards of abortion. 5 These laws exert pressure
against abortion, but they ultimately leave the choice to the woman
involved. In the pledge of allegiance setting, we should also distin-
152. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338,2348-49
(1995).
153. See supra note 90.
154. See supra part II.B.4.
155. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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guish between coercion based on the threat of legal sanction and coer-
cion that uses psychological methods to try to influence choice.
This argument requires me to say more about the relevance of psy-
chological coercion in the setting of teacher-led public school prayer.
Earlier, in part III.A, I set forth the arguments for and against deem-
ing psychological coercion constitutionally relevant, and provisionally
accepted Justice Kennedy's Weisman argument in favor of psychologi-
cal coercion's constitutional relevance. I did not, at that point, distin-
guish between the prayer and the pledge setting, because I was still
accepting the Court's doctrine regarding both school prayer and the
right not to speak, which rendered coercion relevant in both settings
and which did not seem to provide any grounding for treating psycho-
logical coercion differently in the two settings. Then I argued for re-
thinking the right not to speak, and for evaluating certain instances of
governmentally compelled speech as implicating autonomy/per-
sonhood rights rather than free speech rights. The final argument, in
the preceding paragraph, was that psychological coercion should not
be sufficient for an autonomy/personhood claim. Why, then, should it
be sufficient for an Establishment Clause claim?
First, there might be good reasons for allowing broader scope for
the textually based Establishment Clause claim than for the
unenumerated, extratextual autonomy/personhood claim. Precisely
because of the superior constitutional pedigree of the Establishment
Clause claim, we can more confidently extend its scope to include psy-
chological coercion. We should be more wary of extending the scope
of the autonomy/personhood claim, which has a weaker constitutional
pedigree. Although I think this argument significant, one might, how-
ever, reject it as improperly ranking constitutional rights. There is,
then, a second, and more substantive reason for considering psycho-
logical coercion sufficient for an Establishment Clause claim but not
for an autonomy/personhood claim. As I argued above, 56 an auton-
omy/personhood claim involves an insult to the person, a dignitary
harm, which is not violated by psychological coercion alone. One
should not take umbrage at psychological coercion in settings involved
in the autonomy/personhood cases as one takes umbrage at legal coer-
cion. When prayer is coerced, however, the injury cuts to the heart of
what the religion clauses are meant to protect; involuntary prayer is,
often, an immediate harm to the subject's religious conscience, even if
a reasonable observer knows the prayer is compelled, and regardless
of whether the involuntariness is the result of legal or psychological
coercion. In part this is because, for many, prayer implicates concerns
beyond the world, concerns such as the preservation of one's spiritual
life after one's physical death. The act of saying an involuntary pledge
does not carry the same consequences.
156. See supra part III.B.5.
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I have now reached the same conclusion as Judge Easterbrook-
that psychological coercion should invalidate, in the public schools,
teacher-led prayer but not a teacher-led pledge of allegiance.'-5 Judge
Easterbrook's primary argument for this conclusion, however, was
that the Establishment Clause prohibits governmental advancement
of religion through teacher-led public school prayer but says nothing
about governmental advancement of patriotism through a teacher-led
public school pledge of allegiance. Under the structural view of the
Establishment Clause, this would be true, for under that view the ad-
vancement of patriotism is a legitimate governmental end but the ad-
vancement of religion is not. If we accept, however, Justice Kennedy's
argument in Weisman that psychological coercion is relevant to the
constitutional analysis,' and add to that Barnette's holding that the
government may not coerce citizens to speak, 59 then we may no
longer rely on the special way in which the Establishment Clause dis-
ables the government from promoting religion. Adding together
Weisman and Barnette, government coercion of citizen speech is un-
constitutional regardless of the content of the speech, and there is no
reason to believe that psychological pressure will force students to
pray but will not force them to say the pledge. My agreement with
Judge Easterbrook's conclusion, thus, has required moving away from
the structural view of the Establishment Clause, and, instead, recon-
ceptualizing the harm done through a psychologically coerced pledge
of allegiance.
CONCLUSION
The pledge of allegiance problem stems from the intersection of two
lines of Supreme Court doctrine, the school prayer cases and the right
not to speak cases. The most recent school prayer case, Lee v. Weis-
man,160 recognizes psychological pressure on students in public school
as constitutionally relevant to assessing governmentally sponsored
group prayer.' 6' The government may not coerce people to pray, or
to appear to others to be participating in prayer, and the Court said
that psychological pressure counts as coercion.'6 The right not to
speak cases, in turn, bar the government from requiring people to fos-
ter messages they do not wish to foster. If psychological pressure to
pray is recognized as constitutionally relevant, then the same pressure
to join in a group pledge of allegiance might also be recognized as
constitutionally relevant. If the government may not coerce people to
pray, and psychological pressure counts as coercion, and if the govern-
157. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
158. See supra part LB.
159. See 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
160. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).




ment may not coerce people to speak, and psychological pressure still
counts as coercion, then the pledge of allegiance may not be led by
teachers in public-school classrooms. Or so the argument would go.
In this Article, I have suggested two ways around this conclusion,
both involving revision of constitutional doctrine. The first is to un-
derstand the school prayer cases as involving a structural concern with
governmental involvement in religious activities. The Establishment
Clause, on this view, prohibits governmentally sponsored prayer in
public schools regardless of coercion analysis. Furthermore, we could
recognize psychological coercion not only as not necessary for an Es-
tablishment Clause claim in the setting of public-school prayer, but as
irrelevant to constitutional analysis more generally. On this argu-
ment, psychological coercion is proximately worked by fellow stu-
dents, not by the government.
The second way around the conclusion that the pledge of allegiance
may not be led by teachers in public schools, even with an opt-out
provision, is to rethink the right not to speak cases. My main argu-
ment here is that compelled speech often should be considered nonex-
pressive, and thus not covered by the Free Speech Clause. If a
reasonable observer would understand another's speech as compelled
by the government, and as not necessarily reflective of the speaker's
own beliefs, then the Free Speech guarantee is not in play. There are
other ways that the government might violate the Free Speech Clause
in the compelled speech setting, however, and we should be attuned to
them as well. So, the government may not prohibit the dissent of
those it is compelling to speak, and the government may not trigger a
speech requirement by the speaker's antecedent expression, in a selec-
tive and unjustifiable way. But if none of these predicates obtains,
then the Free Speech Clause is the wrong constitutional hook for ar-
guments against governmentally compelled speech. In some cases,
however, compelling speech violates an autonomy or personhood
right of the individual, intruding on the person and insulting the per-
son's dignity through requiring the person to speak words she would
rather not speak. The right here is similar to that in the "substantive
due process" cases. The right does not apply to corporations, how-
ever, nor does it apply to individuals when the speech they are forced
to foster is detached from them personally.
If we understand the compelled speech (or right not to speak) cases
in this way, then we can bar the pledge of allegiance when compelled
through threat of legal sanction, while permitting it if students have
the legal option not to participate. For even if we recognize psycho-
logical pressure as constitutionally relevant in the prayer setting, we
should consider it insufficient as the predicate for an autonomy/per-
sonhood claim, for such pressure does not harm the dignitary interests
of the person as does the threat of legal sanctions.
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